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Abstract  
 
This paper examines the effect of foreign travel by the leader or the head of state on the 
ability of the country to attract foreign capital, as reflected by foreign direct investment 
inflows. The key difficulty in determining a causal effect is the issue of endogeneity. As much 
as the leader’s trips abroad may attract foreign capital inflows, it is also possible that leaders 
are tempted to visit countries known to have a high level of investment out of their borders. 
To deal with potential endogeneity, we introduce a novel instrumental variable. The 
instrument used is urban distance which is defined as the gap between the level of urban 
development in the country of the leader relative to that of the United States. The 2SLS shows 
that the leader’s trips variable, instrumented by urban distance, has a statistically significant 
negative coefficient. This is the case even after the inclusion of other control variables and 
after using alternative samples. This result implies that these costly trips by the leaders can 
crowd out spending on the infrastructure needed for foreign investment, and can signal lack of 
seriousness by the leaders in spending on the implementation of reforms needed to attract 
foreign capital. 
 
JEL Code : F21, F23, H11 
Keyswords : International Investment, Foreign Direct Investment, Executive 
 
 
 
« Partout où je vais tout le monde veut avoir des nouvelles du Congo (…) Je fais un travail, 
ensemble avec mes collaborateurs de chercher des investisseurs, les rassurer, etc.  
Nous allons continuer. Nous n’allons pas les écouter. Ils avaient promis de tout faire pour 
que les investisseurs ne viennent pas au Congo. Nous avons pensé qu’ils sont des frères alors 
qu’ils sont des sorciers...  
Je ris souvent quand j’écoute la polémique sur le voyage présidentiel. On a ramené plus d’un 
milliards et demi de dollars grâce à ces voyages, et je vais poursuivre pour ramener les 
investisseurs au Congo ».1  
Speech by the President of the DRC, Félix Tshisekedi, to the Congolese diaspora in Paris (11/11/2019) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper examines the effect of the number of foreign trips by the leader of the 
country or the head of the government on foreign investment inflows. To be specific, this 
paper investigates whether foreign travel by a country's leader allows the country to attract 
more foreign capital and to entice foreign firms to invest in their economy. This is the first 
attempt in the literature to consider the number of trips by heads of state as a determinant of 
foreign direct investment. 
The intuition is straightforward. Leaders and heads of governments travel abroad for a 
plethora of purposes. One of the most important reasons is to strengthen bilateral economic 
ties between their country and the countries they are visiting. These economic ties can be 
fostered by increasing trade and commercial exchange, attracting foreign capital inflows, 
containing any potential political disputes or border conflicts, and facilitating travel and 
cultural exchange between the citizens of the two countries. In the context of this paper, these 
foreign trips allow the leaders to meet with potential foreign officials and investors, to present 
to them the investment opportunities available in their countries, to persuade them to invest in 
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 Translation : « Everywhere I go everyone wants to hear from the Congo (…) I do a job, together with my 
colleagues, to seek investors, reassure them, etc.  We will continue. We are not going to listen to them. They 
promised to do everything to prevent investors from coming to the Congo. We thought they were brothers when 
they were wizards ... I often laugh when I listen to the controversy over the presidential trip. We brought in over 
a billion and a half dollars through these trips, and I'm going to continue to bring investors back to the Congo." 
their economies, to highlight the concessions and incentives that can be afforded to foreign 
investors, to bargain with them over the terms of their investment, and to negotiate for better 
economic outcomes for their country. Foreign investors can also take the trip of the head of 
the state as a strong signal from the highest levels of a country's leadership for their serious 
commitment to facilitate foreign capital flows, to offer concessions to foreign firms, to ensure 
the security of foreign property, and to spend on the essential infrastructure for this type of 
investment. Thus, we would expect that the number of leaders’ trips to be positively 
associated with foreign direct investment. 
On the other hand, the travel of the head of the government is costly. Leaders usually 
travel with a large entourage that includes security personnel, policy makers, public officials, 
expert advisors, private entrepreneurs, staff of the presidential cabinet, members of the press 
corps and others. These trips are a burden on the coffers of the state due to the need to cover 
the cost of traveling, lodging, security, transportation, and meetings of the leaders and their 
retinue. These costly trips increase the opportunity cost for the social and physical 
infrastructure essential for foreign investment. This can include human capital spending that 
improves the level of skills of domestic workers who can potentially be hired by foreign 
investors, in addition to spending on the infrastructure for transportation, communication and 
utilities that are essential for any type of investment. Thus, the leaders’ trips can lead to a 
crowding out effect where an increase in these costly trips abroad may lead to a reallocation 
of resources away from productive spending that is essential for investment. Leaders who 
travel a lot can also send a negative signal to investors. These trips can be interpreted as a lack 
of seriousness in dealing with challenges that these countries face, or lack of commitment to 
implement reforms needed to attract foreign capital, or lack of interest in spending on the 
social and physical infrastructure necessary for foreign investment. These trips, and the 
leader’s direct involvement, can also signal the inefficiencies of the other institutions that are 
supposed to be in the forefront of the efforts of attracting foreign capital, such as the chambers 
of commerce, the diplomatic corps, or any government agencies in charge of attracting 
foreign investments. Thus, we would expect a counter-intuitive result where the leaders’ trips 
would have an adverse effect on foreign direct investment. 
Given that the effect of the number of leaders’ foreign trips on foreign investment 
inflows is inconclusive, an empirical analysis is warranted. To achieve its objective, the paper 
uses a novel variable that indicates the number of trips by a leader or a head of a government 
to the United States of America, which is derived from the archives of the U.S. Department of 
State. The baseline results, using Ordinary Least Squares estimation, show that the number of 
leaders’ trips has a statistically significant negative coefficient, which provides evidence that 
these foreign trips adversely affect foreign direct investment inflows. These results are robust 
even after the inclusion of several control variables that are identified in the literature as 
determinants of foreign direct investment such as income per capita, economic growth, 
infrastructure, institutional quality, natural resources and others. 
However, the key difficulty in determining a causal effect of the number of leader’s 
trips to the United States on foreign direct investment is the issue of endogeneity. First, the 
association may be spurious due to a failure to account for an unobserved channel that may 
determine both variables. Second, as much as the leader’s trips abroad may attract foreign 
direct investment inflows, it is also possible that leaders are tempted to visit countries known 
to have a high level of investment out of their borders. In this case, the United States is one of 
the countries with is a significant capital outflow seeking a better return. Thus, leaders would 
tend to go there to attract American capital to their economies. This highlights an issue of 
reverse causality.  
To deal with potential endogeneity, we use a novel instrumental variable. The 
instrument that we use is urban distance, which captures the gap between the level of urban 
development in the leader’s country and that of the United States. The Two Stage Least 
Squares estimation confirms the previous findings and shows that the leaders’ trips variable 
has an adverse effect on foreign capital inflows. This is robust even after the inclusion of 
other control variables and after using alternative samples in the analysis. 
This paper contributes to the pertinent literature in various ways. The paper is the first 
attempt to examine the effect of foreign travel by heads of state on attracting foreign capital. 
The second contribution of the paper is that it is also the first to highlight the economic 
consequences of a country's leader's trips abroad. The third contribution is the compilation of 
the data set on leaders’ trips to the United States. The final contribution is the use of a novel 
instrumental variable, urban distance, which was not used before in the literature.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the literature 
survey, section 3 includes the detailed description of the data, section 4 includes the empirical 
estimation and the robustness tests, and section 5 concludes. References, tables and figures 
are included thereafter. 
2. Literature 
This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of foreign direct investment. 
The studies in this literature emphasize the significance of several determinants such as the 
level of economic and financial development, the suitability of infrastructure, human capital, 
institutional quality, policy quality and democratic governance. 
Some studies focus on the effect of institutional quality on foreign direct investment. 
These institutions offer protection for the property of foreign firms, protect foreign investors 
from the risk of expropriation, limit bribery payments to corrupt public officials, allow foreign 
firms to enforce contracts, and allows for the judicial independence needed for litigation in 
case of dispute with a domestic entity. In this context, Du et al. (2008) examine the impact of 
institutions, including property rights protection and contract enforcement, on the location 
choice of foreign direct investment. The authors find that U.S. multinationals prefer to invest 
in Chinese regions that have better protection of intellectual property rights, less government 
intervention in business operations, less corruption, and better contract enforcement. Du et al. 
(2012) compare the sensitivity of the location choice of foreign direct investment toward the 
variation in institutional quality across Chinese regions. The authors find that enterprises from 
source countries that are culturally more distant from China exhibit a stronger aversion to 
regions with weaker institutions. Busse and Hefeker (2007) explore the connection between 
political risk, institutions, and FDI inflows. Their results show that political stability, internal 
and external conflict, corruption, ethnic tensions, law and order, government accountability, 
and quality of bureaucracy are significant determinants of FDI inflows. Asiedu et al. (2009) 
examine the effect of the risk of expropriation on FDI inflows. The authors show that the 
threat of expropriation decreases FDI inflows, and that foreign aid mitigates the adverse effect 
of expropriation risk but cannot eliminate it entirely.  
Other studies focus on the effect of the democratic system of governance on the ability 
of the country to attract foreign capital. On one hand, democratic institutions hinder foreign 
capital inflows by constraining the monopolistic approach of multinational corporations, by 
protecting domestic investors from foreign competition, and by constraining host 
governments' desire to offer generous financial incentives and fiscal concessions to foreign 
investors. On the other hand, democratic institutions may promote foreign capital inflows by 
ensuring more credible property rights protection and reducing the risk of expropriation.  
In this context, Li and Resnick (2003) find that increases in democracy enhance 
property rights protection, which indirectly encourages FDI inflows. The authors also find 
that after controlling for their positive effect through property rights protection, democracy 
also decreases FDI inflows. Li (2009) shows that democratic governments are most likely to 
expropriate foreign investment when leaders face little political constraints and when their 
countries experience frequent leadership turnover. The author also finds that autocrats are 
least likely to expropriate foreign assets when they face high political constraints and have 
stayed in power for a long time. Harms and Ursprung (2002) explore whether political 
repression boosts FDI. The authors arrive at the conclusion that multinational enterprises 
appear to be attracted by countries in which civil rights and political freedoms are respected. 
Asiedu and Lien (2011) examine whether the abundance of natural resources in host countries 
alter the relationship between democracy and FDI. The authors find that democracy increases 
FDI inflows if the share of minerals and oil in total exports is less than some critical value.  
Other studies examine the effect of various types of policies on the ability to attract 
foreign capital. Some of these policies have direct implications on foreign investors, such as 
capital controls, while others aim at implementing economic reforms that might attract foreign 
firms. For instance, Asiedu and Lien (2003) examine the effect on FDI of different types of 
capital control policies such as the existence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on capital 
account, and restrictions on the repatriation of export proceeds. The authors show that in the 
1970s and 1980s, none of the policies had a significant effect on FDI, while in the 1990s all 
were significant. The authors also find that capital controls have no effect on FDI to sub-
Saharan Africa and the Middle East, but affects FDI to East Asia and Latin America 
negatively. Asiedu (2006) shows that lower inflation, suitable infrastructure, higher human 
capital, openness to FDI, less corruption, political stability and a dependable legal system 
have a positive effect. These findings suggest that countries can attract FDI by improving 
their institutions and policy quality. Asiedu (2002) explores whether factors that determine 
FDI affect countries in sub-Saharan Africa differently. The results show that better 
infrastructure has no significant effect on FDI to sub-Saharan Africa, while trade openness 
promotes FDI to all developing countries even though the marginal benefit is less for sub-
Saharan Africa. Gastanaga et al. (1998) examine the effects of different policy variables. The 
authors find a particular positive effect of trade openness on foreign direct investment. 
Other studies explore the importance of human capital as countries can enhance their 
attractiveness as locations for FDI by pursuing policies that increase the level of local skills 
and labor force capabilities. In this context, Noorbakhsh et al. (2001) find that human capital 
is a statistically significant determinant of FDI inflows, is one of the most critical 
determinants, and its importance has increased over time. Cleeve et al. (2015) assess the role 
of human capital on FDI inflows to sub-Saharan Africa. Their results show that human capital 
has a significant influence on FDI, but that there is no evidence of the increasing importance 
of human capital on the type of FDI flowing to sub-Saharan Africa. Francois et al. 
(forthcoming) find that greater educational attainment of the leader of the country is 
associated with higher FDI, and that the leader having tertiary education in economics and 
prior experience in business is also associated with greater FDI. Asiedu et al. (2015) examine 
the relationship between HIV/AIDS and foreign direct investment. The authors find that 
HIV/AIDS has a negative but diminishing effect on FDI.  
Besides economic development, some studies argue that the level of financial 
development is also essential to attract foreign direct investment. Desbordes and Wei (2017) 
investigate the various effects that source and destination countries’ financial development 
have on foreign direct investment. The authors find that both source and destination financial 
development have a large positive influence on greenfield, expansion, and mergers & 
acquisitions FDI, by directly increasing access to external finance and indirectly encouraging 
manufacturing activities. 
There are also studies that examine the effect of social capital on economic exchange 
between countries. Guiso et al. (2009) examine how bilateral trust between European 
countries affects their trade and financial flows. The authors find that lower bilateral trust 
leads to less trade between two countries, less foreign portfolio investment, and less foreign 
direct investment.  
The contribution that is closest to ours is Constant and Tien (2010) who examine 
whether foreign-educated African leaders attract more foreign direct investment to their 
country. Their analysis shows that leaders' foreign education promotes foreign direct 
investment, indicating the role of networks and connections that these leaders built while 
studying abroad. Our paper, however, differs from these study in terms of focusing on the 
leaders’ foreign travel rather than the leader's foreign education. Thus, ours study is more 
concerned about the networks and connections that the leaders cultivate during their travels 
abroad rather than those built during their education abroad. We argue that our approach 
makes more sense as the networks created during the leader's education abroad might not be 
with those foreign figures that will eventually influence bilateral economic and commercial 
ties between the two countries. However, the connections made during the leader’s trips are 
with those policy makers and entrepreneurs who are more pertinent to these decisions.  
3. Data 
The countries included in the analysis are Taiwan, Canada, Liberia, Rwanda, Thailand, 
Czech Republic, Niger, Belize, USA, Guyana, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Costa Rica,  
Malta, Ethiopia, Lao PDR, Libya, China, Turkey, Mongolia, Latvia, Guatemala, Uruguay, 
Republic of Moldova, Tajikistan, Saudi Arabia, Greece, Burundi, Tanzania, Portugal, Malawi, 
Netherlands, Antigua and Barbuda, Macao, Gabon, Nigeria, Cuba, Swaziland, Tunisia, 
Bermuda, Mozambique, Oman, Bhutan, Nepal, Georgia, Angola, Armenia, Mali, Denmark, 
Burkina Faso, Papua New Guinea, Venezuela, Uganda, Comoros, Syria, Lebanon, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Equatorial Guinea, Pakistan, Brunei, Kuwait, Algeria, Congo, Bangladesh, 
Mauritius, Eritrea, Honduras, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Haiti, Suriname, Benin, 
Germany, Norway, Lesotho, Central African Republic, Bahamas, Azerbaijan, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Singapore, Yemen, Fiji, Korea, Timor-Leste, Colombia, Albania, Djibouti,  
Nicaragua, Belarus, Jamaica, Madagascar, Brazil, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ireland, 
Iran, France, Egypt, Turkmenistan, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Peru, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, 
New Zealand, Bahrain, Gambia, Zambia, El Salvador, Ukraine, Spain, Croatia, Iraq, Grenada, 
Jordan, Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Hong Kong, Russia, Belgium, Micronesia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Iceland, Dominica, Qatar, Luxembourg, Slovak Republic, Indonesia, Macedonia, Austria, 
Lithuania, Chad, Afghanistan, Slovenia, Tonga, Cameroon, Chile, Poland, Cyprus, Argentina, 
Singapore, Romania, Sudan, Israel, Philippines, Ecuador, Barbados, Panama, Palau, Somalia, 
Seychelles, St. Lucia, Finland, Estonia, Cape Verde,  Paraguay, Vanuatu, United Kingdom, 
Australia, Italy, Montenegro, Kazakhstan, Cambodia, Kiribati, Guatemala, Guinea, Japan. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the analysis.  
The dependent variable in our analysis is foreign direct investment inflow as a 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product. This is derived from the World Development 
Indicators. The variable of interest is leaders' trips, which is calculated as the number of trips 
by the government's leader to the United States of America during the period 1960-2015. This 
data is derived from the Office of the Historian, which is affiliated to the Department of Sate 
of the United States of America.2 Figure 3 shows a world map of leader’s trips to the United 
States during the period 1960-2015. 
Several control variables are used in the analysis. Appendix A presents the source and 
description of all the variables used in this study. Appendix B shows the correlation matrix for 
different variables. 
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 https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory. 
4. Estimation  
This section conducts an empirical estimation of the effect of the number of leaders’ 
trips to the United States of America on foreign direct investment inflows to their country 
during the period 1960-2015. To explore this relationship we use the following equation 
 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖 = 𝜃 + 𝛿𝑖𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑠𝑖 + ℵ𝑖𝛾 + 𝜇𝑖 (1) 
FDIi is foreign direct investment inflows in country i. LeadersTripsi is the number of 
trips by the leader of country i to the United States. ℵi is a vector of control variables and μi is 
the error term. The vector of control variables includes those commonly identified in the 
literature as determinants of foreign direct investment. Thus, we control for the age of the 
country since independence, total natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP, the 
logarithm of GDP per capita, annual GDP growth rate, infrastructure (proxied by fixed 
telephone subscriptions per 100 people) and institutional quality. The study is a cross-country 
analysis and applies the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation technique. The choice of 
this technique is dictated by our variable of interest, which is only available in cross-section. 
To the best of our knowledge, the variable of interest on leaders’ trips has never been 
used before in economic analysis. To collect this variable, we used historical data from the 
Department of State of the United States of America. We counted the number of leaders' trips 
to the U.S.A. from 1960 to 2015. Initially, the objective was to use the total number of 
leaders’ trips to all countries. However, the unavailability of this type of data did not allow us 
to have such a distribution. Thus, instead of considering all destination countries we only 
consider leaders’ trips to the main country with capital outflows. This is a fact that deserves to 
be emphasized as the United States is identified as the main investor according to (OECD, 
2020). This fact can justify our focus on travel by leaders to the United States. 
5. Baseline Results 
The baseline results are included in table 2. Column 1 includes the coefficient of the 
number of leader’s trips without any control variables, column 2 adds the age of the country, 
column 3 adds the natural resources rents, column 4 adds the logarithm of GDP per capita, 
column 5 adds the annual GDP growth rate, column 6 adds a proxy for infrastructure, and 
column 7 adds the institutional quality.  
The OLS estimation shows that the leaders' trips variable has a statistically significant 
negative coefficient in all specifications. This implies that the higher the number of foreign 
trips by the head of state the less foreign capital the country can attract in the form of foreign 
direct investment. It is also worth noting that the coefficient gets larger the more control 
variables we add to the regression equation. When we include all the control variables, the 
leaders' trips variable has a significant coefficient of -0.085. This implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in the number of leaders' trips to the United States translates into a decrease 
in foreign direct investment by 1.44.   
The results also show that the logarithm of GDP per capita shows a statistically 
significant positive association with foreign direct investment, but it loses its significance 
once we add annual GDP growth rates. This implies that economic growth is more important 
than the level of development for foreign direct investment. As expected, the proxy for 
infrastructure has a statistically significant positive coefficient. Institutional quality, however, 
does not seem to matter as this aspect might be captured already by the economic growth 
indicator. The results also show that time since independence and resource abundance do not 
have statistically significant coefficients.  
6. Robustness Tests 
6.1 Influential Observations 
The OLS estimates could be affected by the influence of a certain number of 
observations. Figure 1 shows the relationship between FDI and the number of leaders' trips. 
This graph shows that countries like Japan (JPN), Guatemala (GMT), Guinea (GIN), China 
(CH2), Kiribati (KIR), Cambodia (KHM) and Kazakhstan (KAZ) appear as outliers.  
Our first sensitivity check estimates our baseline specification, with our full set of 
control variables, after dropping the ten countries with the largest number of leaders’ trips. 
The results are presented in column 1 of table 3. However, this technique is generically weak 
and, thus, more robust estimations are called for. Considering this issue, we apply Hubert’s 
Iteratively Weighted Least Squares IWLS as in Huber (1964, 1973) and Li (1985). This 
technique is used to mitigate the influence of outliers in an otherwise normally distributed 
data set, which serves to test the robustness of the results. The results are presented in column 
2 of table 3. We omit all observations for which |DFBETAi| > 2/√N, where N is the number of 
observations—in our case, 150. 
These different corrections do not affect the results found so far. The coefficient of the 
leaders’ trips remains negative and statistically significant. In different terms, the outliers 
have no real impact on the direction, sign or significance of the relationship of interest. 
Figure 1. Leaders’ Trips and FDI 
 Figure 1 also suggests that our variable of interest is biased to the left. To correct this 
problem, we use two approaches. First, we conduct a logarithmic transformation of the 
leaders’ trips variable. The graph is shown in column 2 of figure 1. Second, we perform a 
zero-skewness Box-Cox power transformation on the leaders’ trips variable to obtain a 
measure with zero skewness. These two transformations cancel out the indicated bias. The 
results after these two transformations are included in columns 4 and 5 of table 3. As in the 
previous sensitivity tests, the bias of the distribution to the left also does not affect the 
relationship of interest. As shown in table 3, the logarithmic transformation of the leaders’ 
trips and the zero-skewness Box-Cox power transformation confirm the sign and statistical 
significance of the coefficient, despite the increase in the magnitude of the coefficient of the 
variable of interest. 
6.2 Identification Strategy: Endogeneity 
The relationship found so far assumes that the leaders’ trips are exogenous to foreign 
direct investment. However, the problem of endogeneity should not be ignored. First, the 
TWNCALBR
RWA
THANER
BLZ
USA
GUY
VCTRIML
ETHLAO
LBY
CHN
TUR
NGLVAGTMURY
MD
TJK
SAUGRCDI
TZAP T
MWI
NLD
ATGMAC
GAB
NGA
CUSWZBMUMOO NBTNNPL
GEO
GORMMLINK
BFAP G
VEU A
COM
SYR
LBN
BIHG QPAKRNKWT
ZA
COGBGDMUSERI
H D
S ELB
HTI
RBENRNOLSOC F
BHS
AZE
STPPGYEM
FJIKOR
LSC L
LB
DJIICLR
JAM
GDBRAARI LI NF GYTKM
MEX
LKAM VPERVNMZWE
NZLBHR
GMB
BSLUKRESPHRV
IRQ
DJORKEN
CIV
HKGUS
BEL
FSMG BI L
DMAQAT
LUX
KIDNM DAUT
LTUTCD
FG
SVN
TONCMRHLP LCYPARGSGPROMDNISR
PHL
ECUB BANLWSOMYCL AFINESTPVPRYVUT GBRAUS
ITA
MNE CH2KAZ
KHM
KIR GMTGIN JPN
-
10
0
10
20
30
40
0 50 100
Leaders' trip to USA
Foreign direct investment (% of GDP)Fitted values
CANLBR
RWA
THANER
BLZ
USA
GUY
VCTRI MLT
ETHLAO
LBY
CHN
TUR
NGLVAGTMURY
MDA
TJK
SAUGRCBDI
TZAPRT
MWI
NLD
ATGMAC
GAB
NGA
CUSWZBMUMOO NBTNNPL
GEO
AGOARMMLIDNK
BFAPNG
VENUGA
COM
SYR
LBN
BIHNQP KRNKWT
DZA
COGB DMUSE I
HND
SLEB
HTI
URB NERNOLSOCAF
BHS
AZE
STPPGYEM
FJIKOR
TLSCOL
ALB
DJINICBLR
JAM
MGDBRAZARI LIRNFRAEGYTKM
MEX
LKAMDVPERVNMZWE
NZLBHR
GMB
BSLVUKRESPHRV
IRQ
G DJORKEN
CIV
HKGUS
BEL
FSMG BI L
DMAQAT
LUX
S KIDNM DAUT
LTUTCD
AFG
SVN
TONCMRHLP LCYPARGSGPROMDNISR
PHL
ECUB BANLWSOMYCLCAFINESTCPVPRYVUTGBRAUS
ITA
MNECH2KAZ
KHM
KIRGMTGINJPN
-
10
0
10
20
30
40
0 1 2 3 4 5
Log Leaders' trip to USA
Foreign direct investment (% of GDP)Fitted values
CANLBR
RWA
THANER
BLZ
USA
GUY
VCTRI MLT
ETHLAO
LBY
CHN
TUR
NGLVAGTMURY
MDA
TJK
SAUGRCBDI
TZAPRT
MWI
NLD
ATGMAC
GAB
NGA
CUSWZBMUMOO NBTNNPL
GEO
GOARMMLIDNK
BFAPNG
VENUGA
COM
SYR
LBN
BIHNQP KRNKWT
DZA
COGB DMUSE I
HND
SLEB
HTI
URB NERNOLSOCAF
BHS
AZE
STPPGYEM
FJIKOR
TLSCOL
ALB
DJINICBLR
JAM
MGDBRAZARI LIRNFRAEGYTKM
MEX
LKAMDVPERVNMZWE
NZL
BHRGMB
BSLVUKRESPHRV
IRQ
G DJORKEN
CIV
HKGUS
BEL
FSMG BI L
DMAQAT
LUX
S KIDNM DAUT
LTUTCD
AFG
SVN
TONCMRHLPCYPARGSGPROMDNISR
PHL
ECUB BANLWSOMYCL AFINESTCPVPRYVUTGBRAUS
ITA
MNECH2KAZ
KHM
KIRGMTGINJPN
-
10
0
10
20
30
40
0 2 4 6
Box-Cox Transformed Log Leaders' trip to USA
Foreign direct investment (% of GDP)Fitted values
association may be spurious due to the failure to account for an unobserved channel which is 
affecting both variables. It is likely that economies that are different for a variety of causes 
will differ both in the number of leaders’ trips and their foreign direct investment inflows as 
well. Second, our leader’s travel variable only considers travel to the United States. This 
country is among the countries where there is a significant outflow of capital seeking a better 
return. In this sense, political leaders would tend to go there. This means that as much as a 
larger number of leader’s trips can attract more foreign capital, it is also possible that leaders 
are tempted to travel to countries known to be major investors out of their borders. This 
highlights the possibility of reverse causality. In the presence of these issues, the OLS 
assumptions are violated. 
To solve this issue, we need a source of exogenous variation in leader’s trips by using 
an instrumental variable approach. The choice in this case is not always obvious. To account 
for these sources of potential endogeneity, we use a novel instrument that we call urban 
distance. Urban distance is defined as the logarithm of the degree of urban development in 
country i divided by the logarithm of the degree of urban development in the U.S.A., which is 
the country that the leaders visit. Naturally, the value of urban distance will be zero for the 
U.S.A.  
We use two measures of urban development to calculate our indicator of urban distance. 
This is a robustness test to ensure that the measure is not sensitive to the choice of the urban 
development indicator. First, we measure the degree of urbanization by the percentage of a 
country's urban population living in that country's largest metropolitan area. We also measure 
the degree of urbanization by the urban land area in square kilometers. 
The identification strategy is based on the intuition that the gap between the urban 
development in the leader’s country and that in the United States justifies a leader’s trip to the 
U.S.A. In this context, the less urbanized the country the more the leader will be tempted to 
travel to the United States to enjoy the urban amenities and to take advantage of the ample 
business opportunities in the urban centers of one of the most developed countries and the 
first economic power. This is to say that behind their multiple trips hides a certain form of 
tourism, in addition to the possibilities of concluding economic, financial and commercial 
transactions.  
Figure 2 illustrates the unconditional relationship between the leaders’ trips and urban 
distance. The first graph shows a positive association, which implies that the larger the 
difference between urban land area in the country of the leader and that of the U.S.A, the 
larger the number of leader’s trips to the United States. The second graph, however, shows a 
negative relationship. This implies that the larger the gap between the percentage of urban 
population living in the largest city of the leader’s country and that of the U.S.A., the smaller 
the number of leader’s trips to the United States. The difference can be attributed to the fact 
that the first measure captures differences in the spread of urban development countrywide. 
Urban distance in this case may tempt the leader to take more trips to the United States. The 
second measure of urban distance, however, captures only the concentration of the urban 
population in the largest city or a first city bias. A high population density in the largest city, 
compared to other urban areas, might not reflect the extent of development in urban areas. 
Accordingly, a smaller urban distance, not a larger gap, might tempt the leader to make more 
frequent trips to the United States. 
Figure 2. Leaders’ Trips and Urban Distance  
 This relationship is conditionally described as follows 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑠𝑖 = 𝜃 + 𝛿𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + ℵ𝑖𝛾 + 𝜇𝑖 (2) 
Where 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑠𝑖 is the leader’s trips in country i, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖  is the urban distance 
in country i and ℵ𝑖 is a vector of controls. Equation (2) constitutes the first stage in our Two 
Stage Least Squares (2SLS) approach, where 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 is used as a source of exogenous 
variation in 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑠𝑖.  
Table 4 shows the effect of leaders’ trips on FDI, corrected for endogeneity. Part A 
shows the results of the second stage of the 2SLS while Part B shows the results of the first 
stage of the estimation. In the first column, we use the urban land area as a measure of urban 
development. In the second column, we use the urban population in the largest city as a 
measure of urban development. 
Since the tests of endogeneity suggest that leaders' trips appear not to be exogenous, we 
use IV-2SLS in subsequent analyses as it is more efficient than the OLS estimation. The first 
step in the estimation suggests that the instrument is valid, whatever the measure of urban 
development used in the construction of the instrumental variable. Looking at the magnitude 
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of the coefficients and the level of significance, it is clear that there is indeed a causal and 
negative effect of the number of leader’s trips on foreign direct investment.  
The coefficient of the leaders’ trips variable, when we use urban land area to construct 
the instrument, is -0.251. This implies that a one standard deviation increase in the number of 
leaders' trips to the United States translates into a decrease in foreign direct investment by 
4.26. The coefficient of the leaders’ trips variable, when we use urban population in largest 
city to construct the instrument, is -0.311. This implies that a one standard deviation increase 
in the number of leaders' trips to the United States translates into a decrease in foreign direct 
investment by 5.28. 
6.3 Controlling for other effects 
In table 5, we control for other effects to confirm the baseline findings. We add other 
control variables such as democracy, prevalence of HIV, trade openness, private credit and 
continental dummies. These variables have been identified by other studies as confounding 
factors for foreign direct investment inflows. The definitions of these variables and their 
corresponding sources are included in Appendix A.  
We estimate equation (2) while adding other control variables highlighted in the 
literature. Table 5 is broken down into two sections according to the two measures of urban 
development used to construct the urban distance instrument. In the first part of this table 
where the urban land area variable is used, the coefficient of the variable of interest confirms 
the direction of the relationship and the level of confidence. In the second part, the direction 
of the relationship remains but the instrument loses its significance at times. This is probably 
due to the possibility that the first instrument is better than the second. 
 
6.4 Alternative Samples 
Table 6 includes further robustness tests by using alternative samples. Column 1 
excludes Africa, column 2 excludes Asia, column 3 excludes the Americas, column 4 
excludes Oceania, column 5 excludes Europe, column 6 excludes OECD countries, while the 
last column focuses only on OECD countries. It is clear that the coefficient of the leader’s 
trips to the United States is statistically significant and negative in all these specifications. The 
significance and size of the coefficient is similar in all these samples except in the OECD one. 
Even though the coefficient is larger in the OECD sample, the statistical significance is 
smaller. 
6.5. Weakness of Instrument 
The next set of robustness tests is conducted to assess whether the instrumental variable 
used in the analysis is weak. If the instrument is weak, the estimated coefficient of interest 
could be biased towards OLS even if the instrument is weakly correlated with the error term. 
In this case, there is an agreement in the literature to use Limited Information Maximum 
Likelihood (LIML) estimation. Therefore, to account for potential instrument weakness, we 
estimate our relationship of interest using the Fuller (1977) version of LIML. This is 
considered more robust than the 2SLS in the presence of weak instruments, as shown in the 
simulations in Hahn et al. (2004), and also has lower small-sample variability than LIML.  
The results of the Fuller’s Limited Information Maximum Likelihood estimation are 
shown in table 7. This table replicates the estimations of tables 5, when we control for 
additional determinants, and those of table 6, when we sue alternative samples, using LIML. 
The results show that the coefficient is statistically significant and negative when we control 
for additional determinants of foreign direct investment, which confirms our previous 
findings. However, when we use alternative samples the coefficient is negative in all 
specifications, but only statistically significant when we exclude OECD countries. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper examines the effect of foreign travel by the leader or the head of the state on 
the ability of the country to attract foreign capital, as reflected by foreign direct investment 
inflows. The baseline results of the OLS estimation show that the number of leader’s trips has 
a statistically significant negative coefficient. These results are robust even after the inclusion 
of control variables such as GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, infrastructure, natural resource 
rents, time since independence, and institutional quality. 
To deal with potential endogeneity, we introduce a novel instrumental variable for the 
number of leader’s trips. The instrument is urban distance defined is the gap between the level 
of urban development in the country of the leader relative to that in the United States. We 
conduct a 2SLS where the urban distance serves as a source of exogenous variation in leader’s 
trips. The 2SLS estimation confirms the previous finding of a statistically significant negative 
coefficient of leader’s trips. This is the case even after the inclusion of other control variables 
and after modifying the sample used. This result implies that these costly trips by the leaders 
can crowd out spending on the infrastructure needed for foreign investment, and can signal 
lack of seriousness by the leaders in spending on the implementation of reforms needed to 
attract foreign capital. 
Future research can investigate the effect of leader’s trips on trade inflows, foreign 
portfolio investment, foreign aid, and foreign debt. Future scholarly endeavors can also 
explore the possibility of expanding the data set of the number of leaders’ trips to other 
countries besides the United States. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs     Mean     Std. Dev.     Min        Max 
Leaders' trip to USA 178    14.58989   16.98871   0        111 
FDI, net inflow 175    3.958817   5.18157   -5.29907   41.43945 
Age of Country  161    163.9876   384.8219   27       2679 
Total natural resources rents (% of 
GDP) 178    7.228907   9.750218   0   42.77812 
Private credit 158    .5059546   .4705474   .0195633   2.303401 
Log of GDP per capita 175    8.955041   1.204171   6.458339   11.67319 
Trade openness 157    .9034614   .5622263   .2051657   3.720 
GDP growth (annual %) 178    3.915802   2.079393  -1.490128   16.49753 
Democracy  149    .3921772   .3776692   0          1 
Fixed telephone subscriptions (per 100 
people) 178    13.65776   14.567   .1275381   59.3074 
Prevalence of HIV 104    2.505547   4.665329   .1   21.65769 
Institutional quality 160   -.2205607    2.246149  -4.893744   4.592062 
Urban Distance calculated by 
Population in the largest city (% of 
urban population) 
143    1.203234   .5810638  -.9515346   2.401688 
Urban Distance calculated by urban 
land area (sq. km) 149   -5.373651    2.029003  -12.30206  -.7452182 
Africa  168 .2797619   .4502241   0          1 
Americas  168 .172619    .3790474   0          1 
Asia  168 .2559524   .4376998   0          1 
Europa  168 .2261905   .4196146   0          1 
Oceania  168 .0654762   .2481037   0          1 
  
Table 2. Basline Results 
 
I II III IV V VI VII Beta 
Leaders' trips to USA -0.039*** -0.038** -0.035* -0.067** -0.068** -0.086** -0.085** -.268 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) 
 
Age of Country  
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 .587 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Total natural resources rents 
(% of GDP)   0.022 0.031 0.013 0.088 0.087 .012 
   
(0.075) (0.080) (0.086) (0.089) (0.089) 
 
Log of GDP per capita 
   
1.134** 1.074** -0.796 -0.882 -.022 
    
(0.558) (0.542) (0.886) (0.956) 
 
GDP growth (annual %) 
    
0.383 0.628*** 0.647*** .258 
     
(0.243) (0.240) (0.240) 
 
Fixed telephone subscriptions 
(per 100 people)      0.211** 0.217** -.198 
      
(0.089) (0.092) 
 
Institutional quality 
      
0.031 .155 
       
(0.224) 
 
Cons 4.531*** 4.643*** 4.444*** -5.254 -6.081 6.623 7.229 
 
 
(0.531) (0.583) (0.883) (4.208) (4.571) (6.645) (7.292) 
 
Number of observations 175 158 158 156 156 156 150 
 
R2 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.076 0.098 0.183 0.183 
 
Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3. Robustness with respect to Influential Observations 
 
Omit 10 countries 
with most 
Leaders' trips 
IWLS Omit if 
|DFBETA| > 
2/√𝑵 Log of Leaders' trips to USA Box-Cox Transformation of Leaders' trips 
Leaders' trips to USA -0.079** -0.041*** -0.074*** -1.250* -1.093** 
 
(0.035) (0.013) (0.017) (0.643) (0.552) 
Fixed telephone subscriptions 
(per 100 people) 0.217** 0.027 0.092** 0.194** 0.196** 
 
(0.097) (0.026) (0.037) (0.089) (0.089) 
Institutional quality 0.049 -0.140 -0.139 0.065 0.066 
 
(0.237) (0.089) (0.108) (0.217) (0.217) 
Age of Country  -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP growth (annual %) 0.622** 0.108 0.542*** 0.657*** 0.658*** 
 
(0.242) (0.097) (0.205) (0.231) (0.232) 
Log of GDP per capita -0.896 0.251 0.255 -0.713 -0.717 
 
(0.992) (0.291) (0.365) (1.032) (1.030) 
Total natural resources rents 
(% of GDP) 0.096 -0.011 0.001 0.077 0.076 
 
(0.097) (0.023) (0.035) (0.099) (0.098) 
Cons  7.293 0.448 -1.235 7.661 7.569 
 
(7.581) (2.212) (2.982) (7.409) (7.438) 
Number of observations 143 150 142 150 150 
R2 0.180 0.109 0.238 0.175 0.177 
Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4. 2SLS Regressions of Leaders’ Trips on FDI 
 
Panel A : Two-Stage Least Squares 
 
Urban Distance 
calculated by urban 
land area (sq. km) 
Urban Distance calculated by 
Population in the largest city 
(% of urban population) 
Leaders' trips to USA -0.251*** -0.311** 
 
(0.064) (0.142) 
Fixed telephone subscriptions (per 100 
people) 0.287** 0.252* 
 
(0.126) (0.134) 
Institutional quality 0.212 0.101 
 
(0.317) (0.313) 
Age of Country  0.001 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.003) 
GDP growth (annual %) 0.803*** 0.352 
 
(0.262) (0.289) 
Log of GDP per capita -1.004 -0.262 
 
(1.318) (1.154) 
Total natural resources rents (% of 
GDP) 0.036 0.019 
 
(0.114) (0.106) 
Cons  9.497 6.212 
 
(10.442) (9.172) 
 
Panel B : First Stage Estimates for  Leaders' Trips to USA 
Urban Distance 
 4.433***  -5.158** 
 
(.6645) (2.400) 
F(excluded instruments) 23.90  3.62 
First Stage R2 0.4281 0.3479 
Wu-Hausman F test (p-value) 0.000  0.009 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test (p-
value) 0.000 0.008 
Number of observations 126 121 
Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5. 2SLS Regressions Controlling for Alternative Determinants of FDI 
Part 1. Urban Distance calculated by urban land area (sq. km) 
 
I II III IV V 
 
Panel A : Two-Stage Least Squares 
Leaders' trip to USA -0.260*** -0.168** -0.251*** -0.287*** -0.238*** 
 
(0.083) (0.077) (0.067) (0.079) (0.061) 
Fraction of years under democracy 5.184** 
    
 
(2.441) 
    
Prevalence of HIV 
 
-0.212 
   
  
(0.161) 
   
Trade openness 
  
1.182 
  
   
(1.516) 
  
Private credit 
   
-0.354 
 
    
(1.493) 
 
Asia  
    
3.637 
     
(2.467) 
Africa  
    
5.584** 
     
(2.817) 
Americas  
    
4.583* 
     
(2.475) 
Europa  
    
3.529 
     
(2.443) 
 
Panel B : First Stage Estimates for  Leaders' Trips to USA 
Urban Distance  4.343***  4.243*** 4.387*** 3.950***  4.510*** 
 
(1.044) (.773) (.681) (.658) (.679) 
F(excluded instruments) 24.91 11.68 16.56 17.84 23.72 
First Stage R2 
 0.408 0.525  0.422 0.398  0.433 
Wu-Hausman F test (p-value) 0.000 0.005  0.001  0.000 0.000 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test (p-
value) 0.000 0.004  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of observations 102 70 121 121 126 
Part 2. Urban Distance calculated by Population in the largest city (% of urban population) 
 
Panel A : Two-Stage Least Squares 
Leaders' trips to USA -0.217 -0.425* -0.385* -0.431* -0.316** 
 
(0.136) (0.234) (0.218) (0.229) (0.142) 
Fraction of years under democracy 2.561 
    
 
(2.381) 
    
Prevalence of HIV 
 
-0.277 
   
  
(0.186) 
   
Trade openness 
  
1.695 
  
   
(1.920) 
  
Private_credit 
   
1.055 
 
    
(1.210) 
 
Asia  
    
4.658* 
     
(2.461) 
Africa  
    
3.515 
     
(2.265) 
Americas  
    
3.219 
     
(2.267) 
Europa  
    
3.475 
     
(2.262) 
 
Panel B : First Stage Estimates for  Leaders' Trips to USA 
Urban Distance  
 -4.690* -7.179***  -3.531  -3.721 -4.821* 
 
 (2.625) (2.509)  (2.494)  (2.345) (2.489) 
F(excluded instruments) 3.83 5.81 1.20 2.46 2.89 
First Stage R2 0.357 0.491 0.328  0.3158 0.3560 
Wu-Hausman F test (p-value) 0.116  0.002 0.029 0.010 0.016 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test (p-
value) 0.101 0.001  0.023 0.009 0.012 
Number of observations 116 77 114 117 121 
note: Panels A and B reports coefficients from the second stage and the first stage of 2SLS estimation. All model 
specifications include constant term (note reported to save space) and all control variables in Table 2, column 7. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. .01 -***; .05 - **; .1 - * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 6. Sample Modification 
Part 1. Urban Distance calculated by urban land area (sq. km) 
 
Exclusion 
Africa 
Exclusion 
Asia 
Exclusion 
Americas 
Exclusion 
Oceania 
Exclusion 
Europe 
Exclusion 
OECD 
Only  
OECD 
 Panel A : Two-Stage Least Squares 
Leaders' trips to USA -0.250*** -0.282*** -0.250*** -0.237*** -0.217*** -0.270*** -0.786* 
 
(0.067) (0.078) (0.088) (0.062) (0.061) (0.099) (0.390) 
_cons 8.447 15.448 11.938 12.002 -1.293 3.126 40.251 
 
(13.711) (12.044) (12.048) (10.488) (6.026) (8.318) (49.189) 
 
Panel B : First Stage Estimates for  Leaders' Trips to USA 
Urban Distance 
 4.667*** 4.267***  4.376***  4.327*** 4.626***  4.081*** 3.851 
 
(.885) (.595) (.827) (.662) (.796) (.687)   (2.787) 
F(excluded 
instruments) 16.23 20.88 18.13 15.39 20.81 11.34 1.26 
First Stage R2 0.4224  0.5171  0.4043 0.4219 0.4320  0.4685 0.6930 
Wu-Hausman F test (p-
value) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.022 0.014 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
chi-sq test (p-value) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.015 0.003 
Number of observations 91 99 101 119 94 69 22 
Part 2. Urban Distance calculated by Population in the largest city (% of urban population) 
 Panel A : Two-Stage Least Squares 
Leaders' trips to USA -0.168** -0.304** -0.585 -0.286** -0.172** -0.194*** 0.381 
 
(0.077) (0.151) (0.354) (0.117) (0.083) (0.066) (0.441) 
_cons 17.157 12.003 5.708 8.797 -1.894 0.649 13.736 
 
(11.389) (10.411) (14.082) (9.342) (4.975) (5.933) (23.413) 
 
Panel B : First Stage Estimates for  Leaders' Trips to USA 
Urban Distance  
-4.696  -5.708** -3.214 -5.590** -6.018** -8.359***  12.368 
 
(3.345)  (2.180) (2.859) (2.367)  (2.890) (2.054) (10.698) 
F(excluded 
instruments)  0.83 4.64 1.29 4.57 3.60 6.94 1.55 
First Stage R2 0.3209  0.4375 0.3202  0.3581 0.3732 0.4407  0.7337 
Wu-Hausman F test (p-
value) 0.020 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.089  0.042 0.329 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
chi-sq test (p-value) 0.015 0.008 0.008 0.009  0.075 0.031 0.204 
Number of observations 70 94 101 112 89 67 22 
note: Panels A and B reports coefficients from second and first of the stage of TSLS estimation. All model 
specifications include constant term (note reported to save space) and all control variables in Table 2, Column 7. 
Robust standars errors in parentheses. .01 -***; .05 - **; .1 - * 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Accounting for instrument weakness : Fuller’s Limited Information Maximum Likelihood estimates  
 
Urban Distance calculated by Population in the largest city (% of urban population) 
 
Table 5. Part II Table 6. Part II 
 I II III IV V Exclusion Africa 
Exclusion 
Asia 
Exclusion 
Americas 
Exclusion 
Oceania 
Exclusion 
Europe 
Exclusion 
OECD 
Only  
 
OECD 
Leaders' trip to USA -0.260*** 
-
0.264** 0.075 
-
0.302*** 
-
0.258*** -0.379 -0.178 -0.506 -0.208* -0.129 -0.128** 0.381 
 
(0.079) (0.121) (0.060) (0.104) (0.080) (0.408) (0.113) (0.457) (0.114) (0.082) (0.058) (0.352) 
Fraction of years 
under democracy 5.184**            
 
(2.331) 
           Prevalence of HIV. 
total (% of population 
ages 15-49)  
-0.245 
          
  
(0.153) 
          
Trade openness 
  
0.169*** 
         
   
(0.035) 
         
Private_credit 
   
-0.006 
        
    
(1.400) 
        Asia  
    
3.193 
       
     
(2.575) 
       Africa  
    
3.970 
       
     
(2.606) 
       Americas  
    
5.003* 
       
     
(2.889) 
       
Europa  
    
3.283 
       
     
(2.477) 
       Cons 9.245 19.647* 4.260 10.175 7.236 4.915 12.591 6.635 9.416 -1.042 2.070 13.736 
 
(10.167) (11.873) (5.156) (11.119) (10.715) (14.212) (8.984) (13.314) (8.506) (4.811) (5.109) (18.677) 
Number of 
observations 102 64 102 98 102 85 89 98 107 85 62 22 
All model specifications include constant term (not reported to save space) and all control variables in table 2, Column 7. 
 
Figure 3. World Map of Leader’s Trips 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A. Data Sources
[1,4]
(4,7]
(7,13]
(13,21]
(21,111]
No data
Variables Definitions Sources 
Private credit Value of financial intermediaries credits to the 
private sector as a share of GDP (excludes credit 
to the public sector and credit issued by central 
and development banks), average over 1960–2015 
World Bank WDI online 
database; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Levine (2010) 
Trade openness Sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
as a share of GDP in 1960–2015 
World Bank WDI online 
Database 
Institutional quality An overall indicator of institutional quality 
measured as the sum of the six sub-indices for 
1996 from World Bank Governance Indicators 
(WBGI): voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption. Countries with higher 
values on this index have institutions of greater 
quality 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2010) 
Leaders' trips to USA 
Number of trips by heads of governments or state 
leaders to the USA during the period 1960-2015. 
https://history.state.gov/departm
enthistory 
GDP growth (annual 
%) 
Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita 1960-
2015. 
World Bank WDI online 
Database 
Fixed telephone 
subscriptions (per 100 
people) 
Fixed telephone subscriptions refers to the sum of 
active number of analogue fixed telephone lines, 
voice-over-IP (VoIP) subscriptions, fixed wireless 
local loop (WLL) subscriptions, ISDN voice-
channel equivalents and fixed public payphones 
1960-2015.  
World Bank WDI online 
Database 
Fraction of years under 
democracy 
 Ashraf et al. (forthcoming) 
Population in the 
largest city (% of 
urban population) 
 
Population in largest city is the percentage of a 
country's urban population living in that country's 
largest metropolitan area. 1960-2015. 
World Bank WDI online 
Database 
Prevalence of HIV Prevalence of HIV refers to the percentage of World Bank WDI online 
people ages 15-49 who are infected with HIV. 
1990-2015 
Database 
Age of Country  Difference between the year of independence and 
2015.    
Own Calculation 
Log of GDP per capita GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international 
$) 1960-2015. 
World Bank WDI online 
Database 
Total natural resources 
rents (% of GDP) 
Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil 
rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), 
mineral rents, and forest rents. 1970-2015 
World Bank WDI online 
Database 
Urban land area (sq. 
km) 
Urban land area in square kilometers, based on a 
combination of population counts (persons), 
settlement points, and the presence of Nighttime 
Lights. Areas are defined as urban where 
contiguous lighted cells from the Nighttime Lights 
or approximated urban extents based on buffered 
settlement points for which the total population is 
greater than 5,000 persons. 1990-2010. 
World Bank WDI online 
Database 
Africa Dummy variables that take on the value of one 
when a country belongs to a Africa and 0 
otherwise 
Own Calculation 
Asia Dummy variables that take on the value of one 
when a country belongs to a Asia and 0 otherwise 
Own Calculation 
America Dummy variables that take on the value of one 
when a country belongs to a America and 0 
otherwise 
Own Calculation 
Oceania Dummy variables that take on the value of one 
when a country belongs to a Oceania and 0 
otherwise 
Own Calculation 
Europe Dummy variables that take on the value of one 
when a country belongs to a Europe and 0 
otherwise 
Own Calculation 
 
 
 
Appendix B. Correlations 
 FDI Leaders' 
trips to USA 
Fixed telephone 
subscriptions (per 100 
people) 
Institutional 
quality 
Age of Country  GDP growth 
(annual %) 
Log of 
GDP per 
capita 
Total natural 
resources rents 
(% of GDP) 
FDI 1.0000        
Leaders' trip to USA -0.0614 1.0000       
Fixed telephone 
subscriptions (per 
100 people) 
-0.0458 0.6381 1.0000      
Institutional quality 0.2313 0.1913 0.2336 1.0000     
Age of Country  0.1029 -0.2019 -0.1627 0.0593 1.0000    
GDP growth (annual 
%) 
-0.0751 0.0019 -0.1929 0.0626 -0.0827 1.0000   
Log of GDP per 
capita 
-0.2438 0.6020 0.7613 0.2995 -0.1891 0.0838 1.0000  
Total natural 
resources rents (% of 
GDP) 
0.4085 -0.2041 -0.3246 0.1199 -0.0239 0.1054 -0.2279 1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
